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RECENT CASES
this procedure the mortgagor would have an opportunity for a hearing,
but the expense of a full judicial foreclosure would be avoided.
DANIEL K. BARKLAGE
CRIMINAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-NON-
REVIEWABILITY OF DENIAL OF PROBATION
Smith v. State1
Darwin Lee Smith pleaded guilty to a charge of first degree robbery.
The trial court received a presentence investigation report and sentenced
Smith to the statutory minimum term of five years' imprisonment. Pro-
bation was denied Smith but granted to his codefendants. Smith moved
under rule 27.262 to vacate the judgment of conviction, alleging that he
was denied due process of law because the court relied upon false accusa-
tions against him in the presentence report and this deprived him of the
right of confrontation. The trial court overruled the motion and Smith
appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for two
reasons, without reaching the constitutional question. The court first held
that matters relating to probation and parole do not come within the
scope of rule 27.26. It further held that appellate courts have no power to
review or revise decisions to grant or deny probation by reason of section
549.141, RSMo 1969,3 which provides that the action of any court regard-
ing probation "is not subject to review by any appellate court."
Section 549.141 or a similar provision has been part of Missouri law
Upon such hearing, the clerk shall consider the evidence of the parties
and may consider, in addition to other forms of evidence required or
permitted by law, affidavits and certified copies of documents. If the
clerk finds the existence of (1) valid debt of which the party seeking
to foreclose is the holder, (2) default, (3) right to foreclose under the
instrument, and (4) notice to those entitled to such under subsection (b),
then the clerk shall further find that the mortgagee or trustee can proceed
under the instrument, and the mortgagee or trustee can give notice of
and conduct a sale pursuant to the provisions of this Article . ..
N.C. GEN. STAT § 45-21.16 (1975 Cum. Supp.).
1. 517 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. 1974).
2. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 27.26 provides in part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released
on the ground that such sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution and laws of this State or the United States .... or is other-
wise subject to collateral attack, may file a motion at any time in the
court which imposed such sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
same. ...
3. § 549.141, RSMo 1969, provides:
The action of any court in granting, denying, revoking, altering, ex-
tending or terminating any order placing a defendant upon probation
or parole is not subject to review by any appellate court.
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.since 1897.4 Missouri appellate courts have relied on it in the past in re-
fusing to 'review orders revoking probation or parole.5 In Morrissey v.
Brewer,6 however, the United States Supreme Court held that parole could
not be revoked without meeting certain due process requirements, both in
the factual determination of whether a violation occurred and in the discre-
tionary decision of whether to revoke. The Smith court recognized that
decisions to revoke probation are now reviewable in Missouri because of
Morrissey.7 It held, however, that appellate courts have no power to re-
view a denial of probation.8 The court distinguished the revocation of
probation from the denial of probation by relying on a distinction be-
tween rights and privileges. According to Smith, once probation is granted
it is a right which cannot be taken away without due process of law. Pro-
bation in the first instance, however, "is a privilege which may be granted
or withheld in the discretion of the sentencing court."9
The characterization of a government benefit as a right or a privilege
should not be controlling in determining the applicability of constitu-
tional safeguards to the decision to grant or deny the benefit. 10 The use of
4. In 1897 Missouri became the first state to provide statutory author-
ization for the granting of probation, then called judicial parole. Mo. LAws 1897,
at 71. Section 13 of that act prohibited appellate review of the grant or termina-
iin of probation. See § 549.180, RSMo 1959. In 1963 that section was repealed
and present section 549.141 was enacted. Mo. LAws 1963, at 671, § A.
5. See, e.g., State v. Phillips, 443 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Mo. 1969).
6. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Morrissey involved the administrative revocation
of parole and generally required two hearings. At the second hearing, where
the actual decision to revoke is made, Morrissey stated that the minimum re-
quirements of due process include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e)
a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a
written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. The provisions of Morrissey have been applied to revocation of pro-
bati6n, even though neither revocation of probation nor revocation of parole
is part of the criminal prosecution. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782
(1973). The right to counsel at revocation hearings depends on a case-by-case
decision. Id. at 790.
7. State ex rel. Douglas v. Buder, 485 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. En Banc 1972), rev'd
on other grounds, 412 U.S. 430 (1973).
8. The broad statement of non-reviewability of denial of probation ap-
parently forecloses a state remedy for situations other than that presented in
Smith-e.g., a person allegedly denied probation due to racial or other invidious
discrimination. Also, probation is rarely granted except after a plea of guilty
(justified on the theory that the first step to rehabilitation is an admission of
guilt). This would arguably interfere with an individual's right to a jury trial
because he is punished more severely if he exercises that right. Again, under
Smith, there can be no appeal on this matter.
9. 517 S.W.2d at 150.
10. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Graham v. Richard-
[Vol. 41
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the right-privilege distinction is conclusory and lends itself to circular
reasoning-i.e., because probation is a privilege, constitutional safeguards
do not apply; because constitutional safeguards do not apply, probation is
a privilege. In Graham v. Richardson1 the Supreme Court said that it
"has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' "12
Morrissey quoted this statement with approval and went on to say that
"it is hardly useful . . . to try to deal with this problem in terms of
whether the parolee's liberty is a right or a privilege. 1 3
Instead of relying on the concept of "privilege," other matters should
be considered in making the determination whether the Constitution re-
quires any procedural safeguards. The Morrissey Court used a seemingly
simple test for the general application of due process, but it may not al-
ways be easy to apply. First, it must be determined to what extent the in-
dividual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss." Second, the interest
being taken from the individual must be within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment "liberty or property" language. 14 The difficulty lies in de-
termining whether the individual must be presently enjoying the liberty,
as in Morrissey, or whether the denial of future liberty is also a "grievous
loss."
This problem has been considered by at least two courts dealing with
the application of due process to the administrative decision to grant or
deny parole. In Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole15 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that due process does not attach to the parole-granting decision
becapse the government is not depriving the individual of a benefit previ-
ously conferred. In United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of N.Y.
State Bd. of Parole,'6 however, the Second Circuit held that due process
does attach. It relied on Morrissey and said: "Whether the immediate is-
sue be release or revocation, the stakes are the same: conditional liberty
versus incarceration."' 7 The Second Circuit also pointed out that re-
quiring the liberty to have been previously conferred is really the "right-
privilege dichotomy in a not-too-deceptive disguise."' 8
The Supreme Court vacated the judgments in both Scarpa and Johnson
without opinion, but some indication of the Court's view on this problem
may be found in Wolff v. McDonnell.19 Wolff held that a prisoner's inter-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
11. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
12. Id. at 374.
13. 408 U.S. at 482.
14. Id. at 481.
15. 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated, 414 U.S. 809 (1973).
16. 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom., Regan v. Johnson, 95 S. Ct.
488 (1974).
17. 500 F.2d at 928.
18. Id. at 927-28 n.2.
19. 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
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est in statutory "good time"20 was "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment and could not be taken away without meeting certain pro-
cedural requirements. Because the practical importance of "good time"
is to hasten release of the inmate, Wolff supports the proposition that due
process attaches whenever a convicted person is deprived of prospective
liberty.
The application of due process to the deprivation of prospective liberty
is important when one considers the status of a person eligible for proba-
tion. One approach is to view this status as the legal equivalent of a prison
inmate. Support for this view can be found in section 549.071, RSMo 1969,21
which appears to limit probation to persons of "previous good character"
thus indicating that probation is to be the exception to a general rule
of automatic imprisonment, or, in the words of Smith, "a matter of grace
and clemency." 22 If viewed this way, the determination of constitutional
rights involved in the administrative decision to deny parole to prison
inmates2 3 should be influential in determining rights at the judicial de-
cision to deny probation.
On the other hand, the status of the person seeking probation can be
viewed as analogous to that of a probationer facing revocation. Section
549.291, RSMo 1969, indicates a statutory preference for probation or
parole except where "institutional treatment has been deemed essential."2 4
As a practical matter, the use of probation is so widespread in Missouri
that viewing it as an unusual disposition is difficult to support.23 If this
20. An inmate earns "good time" by good behavior while in prison. Under
the Nebraska statute involved in Wolff, it shortened the offender's sentence for
parole purposes. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Supp. 1975).
21. Section 549.071 (1), RSMo 1969, provides in part:
When any person of previous good character is convicted of any crime
and commitment to the state department of corrections or other con-
finement or fine is assessed as the punishment therefor, the court before
whom the conviction was had, if satisfied that the defendant, if permitted
to go at large, would not again violate the law, may in its discretion,
by order of record, suspend the imposition of sentence or may pro-
nounce sentence and suspend the execution thereof and may also place
the defendant on probation upon such conditions as the court sees fit....
22. 517 S.W.2d at 150.
23. See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
24. Section 549.291, RSMo 1969, provides:
Sections 549.205 to 549.291 shall be liberally construed to the end that
the treatment of persons convicted of crime shall take into consideration
their individual characteristics, circumstances, needs, and potentialities
as revealed by a case study, and that such persons shall be dealt with
in the community by a uniformly organized system of constructive re-
habilitation, under probation supervision instead of in correctional in-
stitutions, or under parole supervision when a period of institutional
treatment has been deemed essential, whenever it appears desirable in the
light of the needs of public safety and their own welfare.
25. See generally MissouRI BOARD OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1973-1974. On June 30, 1974, the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole
was supervising 8,511 probationers for Missouri courts, compared to 1,059
parolees from the state prisons and 354 parolees from local jails. Id. at 28.
[Vol. 41
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second approach is accepted, then incarceration-i.e., denial of probation,
would involve the same type of loss as that which justified safeguards in
Morrissey.
The other ground for dismissing the appeal in Smith was the court's
holding that infirmities in the denial of probation do not come within the
scope of rule 27.26,26 which provides relief to a prisoner in custody under
a sentence subject to collateral attack. The court, relying on dicta in Mc-
Culley v. State,27 distinguished between "sentence" and "probation." Ac-
cording to McCulley, the sentence is the "punishment that comes within
the particular statute designating the permissible penalty for the particular
offense."28 McCulley further stated that probation or parole is not part of
the sentence.2 9 This distinction between "sentence" and "probation" is im-
portant not only because it limits the scope of rule 27.26, but also because
the Constitution guarantees some rights at sentencing.
In Mempa v. Rhay3O the Supreme Court held that sentencing, even
when delayed and combined with revocation of probation, was a stage of
the criminal prosecution and as such required appointment of counsel for
indigents. The holding was not limited to the effect of counsel on the
appellate process, but extended to the presentation of evidence in mitiga-
tion of punishment.3 ' It is not entirely clear what other rights, if any,
attach at sentencing. Unresolved matters include disclosure of presentence
This is significant because 47% of all releases from the Department of Corrections
were on parole. Id. at 29.
26. 517 S.W.2d at 150. The same result has been reached in revocation of
probation cases. Green v. State, 494 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. En Banc 1973); Stroder v.
State, 522 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975). The court has not always
viewed rule 27.26 so restrictively. In Benson v. State, 504 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1974),
the court ruled on the merits of a rule 27.26 motion that claimed the trial
court had delegated its judicial discretion to the parole officer. In that case the
defendant sought only to vacate the denial of probation, not the sentence.
27. 486 S.W.2d 419 (Mo. 1972). McCulley is distinguishable because it was
limited to the question whether the granting of probation in one instance should
be considered in determining which of two sentences was more severe. In de-
ciding that it should not be considered, the court reasoned that because the
probation might be revoked, the correct comparison was of the potential period
of imprisonment in each case. This was dicta, because the court upheld the
heavy second sentence on the basis that North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969), was not to be applied retroactively. 486 S.W.2d at 426.
28. 486 S.W.2d at 423.
29. id.
30. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). For a more detailed discussion of Mempa and rights
at sentencing, see Note, 81 HAnv. L. REv. 821 (1968).
31. 389 U.S. at 135. Beyond presenting evidence in mitigation of punish-
ment, it is not dear what counsel can do to prevent a sentence being based
on improper or incorrect information. A sentencing judge is not restricted to
evidence received in open court with right of cross-examination. Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). However, courts have held some matters improperly
considered. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389
U.S. 109, 115 (1967); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971); State v. Killian, 91 Ariz. 140, 370 P.2d 287
(1972); People v. Rednour, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 322 N.E.2d 492 (1974); State v.
Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (1960).
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reports3 2 and a requirement that the court state reasons for the sentence."3
It is important to note, however, that some recent criminal code revisions
permit appellate review of sentences.3 4
There are several reasons why the decision to grant or deny probation
should be viewed for constitutional purposes as being a part of sentencing,
and thus subject to the protections afforded by Mempa and the developing
law of due process at sentencing. Such a view recognizes that probation,
through the imposition of conditions, supervision, and threatened incar-
ceration, is a form of deprivation of liberty just as is imprisonment fol-
lowing sentencing.35 Secondly, section 549.071 6 provides a general authori-
zation for probation. There is no reason, then, to require that an
authorization for probation be included in each penalty statute in order
for constitutional rights to be involved, as McCulley seemed to say.3 7
Finally, the decision to grant or deny probation may come before or after
the imposition of a prison term38 and is generally influenced by the same
facts that determine the length of incarceration.
The Supreme Court has in recent years recognized that the discre-
tionary judicial decisions to revoke probation and to sentence offenders
involve constitutionally-protected interests of the offender. Smith v. State
distinguished the decision to grant or deny probation by relying on the
right-privilege distinction and on a narrow definition of "sentence."
These should not be compelling for constitutional law purposes; rather,
the similarities in the offender's stake in the outcome and in the factors
influencing the decisions should be considered. To the extent that the
procedures are similar, it is evident that before probation is denied the
offender should enjoy some of the rights he would enjoy in the discretionary
aspect of either probation revocation or sentencing.
HARLAN W. PENN
32. See generally Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 613 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961 (1971) (Browning, J., separate opinion); Mr.
Justice Douglas' statement dissenting to adoption of FED. RULE OF CRIM. PROC.
32(c) (2), 39 F.R.D. 69 (1965); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND RE-
VIEW, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 4.4 (Approved Draft, 1968);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.07 (5) Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); Zastrow,
Disclosure of the Presentence Investigation Report, 35 FED. PROB. 20 (Dec. 1971).
33. United States v. Garden, 428 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1970).
34. See, e.g., Mo. PROP. GRIM. CODE § 2.070 (2) (1973). See also Parsons-
Lewis, Due Process in Parole-Release Decisions, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1518, 1545 (1972).
35. See generally ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRO-
BATION (Approved Draft, 1970).
36. See statute quoted note 21 supra.
37. 486 S.W.2d at 423.
38. See statute quoted note 21 supra.
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